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APPENDIX No. 2

WAR DEPARTMENT, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

CROSS-REFERENCE INDEX TO TESTIMONY BEFORE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

This Cross-Reference Index has the following features:

1. Titles and sub-titles are listed alphabetically.
2. Main titles are shown in full capital type; sub-titles are preceded by a hyphen and are in regular type; secondary sub-titles are preceded by two hyphens; a few sub-titles are preceded by a triple hyphen; e. g.,

MARSHALL

-Communications with Short

--Message 7 December

---Washington Signal Office handling

3. The references to the record are by name of witness and page number, thus STIMSON 4072, means the testimony of Secretary of War Stimson on page 4072 of the transcript of the testimony.

4. The Index proper is paged with arabic numerals. The cross-reference key to this Index is paged with Roman numerals, and appears on pages *ii* thru *xiv*. The cross-reference key is designed to give the arabic page numbers of the Index on which the titles and sub-titles will be found.

5. Related subject matter is frequently found listed under two or more titles or sub-titles. For example, references concerning aircraft available in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, will be found under the following headings:

ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

-Planes available, daily reports p. 23

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

-Only 3 U. S. fliers got in air p. 26

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE

-Army planes available p. 31

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE

-Navy fighter planes available p. 33

RECONNAISSANCE

-By Army

--Insufficient planes p. 67

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-By Army

--Planes available p. 68

RECONNAISSANCE

-Distant by Navy p. 68

--Navy planes available p. 70

6. In using the Index, the following steps are suggested:

(a) *Select all relevant main titles on page iv* which could possibly cover the subject sought; for example, take the subject of the 27 November message from the War Department to General Short. Relevant main titles, found in the list on page *iv*, are:

ALERTS IN HAWAII

ALERT NO. 1

ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION
 ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
 MARSHALL
 NAVY
 RECONNAISSANCE
 SHORT

(b) Select all relevant sub-titles on pages *v* through *wix*; e. g., in the example suggested in (a) above, if it is desired to find out all matters bearing on the 27 November message and its results, each of the main titles listed will be found to have several relevant sub-titles, like

ALERTS IN HAWAII

- Laxity alleged, late November p. 11
- No Army-Navy cooperation on p. 12

ALERT NO. 1

- Decision by Short p. 13
- Differences from Alerts 2 and 3 p. 14
- Not a mistake p. 14
- Planes ready in 4 hours, under p. 15

ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION

- Conference 27 November Martin, Short, Kimmel and Mollison

ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

- "War Warning" Message, 27 November p. 23

MARSHALL

- Communications with Short p. 61
- Message, WD, 27 November p. 62
- Reply to 27 November Message p. 62

RECONNAISSANCE

- By Army p. 67
- Ordered by War Department p. 68

- Not discussed by Short and Kimmel 27 November conference p. 71

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- Message, WD, 27 November p. 79

(c) Turn to the appropriate arabic numbered page or pages of the Index, given after each relevant title and sub-title. Then refer to the Record page number or numbers listed under the main titles and sub-titles of this cross-reference Index for the testimony thereon. Page 90 at the end of this volume contains a TABLE FOR FINDING VOLUMES FROM PAGE REFERENCES.

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LIST OF MAIN TITLES

AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

ALERTS IN HAWAII

ALERT NO. 1

ARMY MISSION IN HAWAII

ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS

ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION

ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

CANOL PROJECT

G-2 KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS

HOFFMAN, ROBERT

JAPAN

JAPANESE IN HAWAII

KIMMEL

KUHN, OTTO

MARSHALL, GENERAL GEORGE C.
 MARTIAL LAW
 NAVY
 NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII
 ORANGE PLAN
 RAINBOW PLAN
 RECONNAISSANCE
 ROHL, HANS WILHELM
 SHORT
 TENNEY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE
 WAR COUNCIL
 WYMAN, COL. THEODORE

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CROSS-REFERENCE KEY

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 - Contra* p. 1
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- Continuous operation not reported to Navy p. 1
- Contract, Wyman arranged p. 1
- Degree completed 7 December p. 1
- Delays, causes of p. 2
 - Arrival of equipment p. 2
 - Diversion of equipment p. 2
 - Not by Washington p. 2
 - Contra* p. 2
 - Not contractors p. 3
 - Not lack of personnel p. 3
 - Contra* p. 3
 - Personnel difficulties p. 3
- Difficulties of permanent erection and location p. 3
- Effort to get functioning p. 3
- Equipment present, except cables p. 3
- Fixed, equipment delivered October 1941 p. 4
- Funds allotted p. 4
- Haleakala Job Order 41.0 p. 4
- Higher command, not AWS-minded p. 4
- Highest priority p. 4
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- Information Center p. 4
 - In general p. 4
 - Communication with stations, not good p. 4
 - Development of p. 4
 - Functioning p. 4
 - Naval liaison requested p. 5
- Interceptor Command p. 5
 - Activated 17 December p. 5
 - Contra* p. 5
 - Air Force cooperation p. 5
 - Jealousy, Signal and Air Corps p. 5
 - Navy should know from Lt. Burr p. 5
 - "No definite organization" p. 5
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- No trained control officers or operators p. 6-7
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 - Only real Army reconnaissance p. 7
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 - WD interest in p. 10
 - Wyman not responsible for material p. 10
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